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I. 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are listed in the 
caption. 
• • 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee agrees with Appellant's statement of jurisdiction. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Bone submits that the issues and applicable standards of 
appellate review are as follows: 
1. Whether a plaintiff who fails to prove any threshold 
requirement under Utah no-fault law may recover a general damage 
verdict. 
2. Whether the district court erred in striking 
Plaintiff's general damage award when the jury found Plaintiff 
failed to satisfy the $3,000 medical expense threshold required 
to maintain an action for general damages under Utah's no-fault 
law, U.C.A. § 31A-22-309. 
3. Whether there was evidence upon which the jury could 
find that the Plaintiff incurred less than $3,000 in medical 
expenses related to the accident. 
4. Whether plaintiff has waived any claim of jury 
prejudice by failing to request jurors to be excused for cause or 
failure to exercise preemptory challenges, where the alleged 
prejudice was known by counsel prior to empanelment of the jury. 
5. Whether plaintiff's failure to request or object to the 
court's failure to include instructions or special verdict forms 
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addressing permanent disability constitutes waiver of error on 
appeal. 
6. Whether the failure to give instructions on permanent 
disability is harmless error in light of the evidence that 
plaintiff suffered no objective impairment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of denial of motion for new trial is 
for abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1315 
(Utah 1988). 
With respect to issues 1 and 2, questions of law are to be 
reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 
759 (Utah 1990) . 
With respect to issue 3, "To successfully attack the 
verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence supporting 
the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it." Hind v. Ouilles, 745 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1987). 
Review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to 
support a verdict will be reversed only if, in reviewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it concludes 
the evidence is insufficient to support the award. Cambelt Int'l 
Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). Hansen v. 
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
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With respect to issue 4, where the party knows of potential 
juror prejudice or bias, challenge must be asserted before the 
jury is sworn, otherwise the error is waived. Burton v. 
Z.C.M.I., 249 P.2d 514 (Utah 1952). 
With respect to issues 5 and 6, Appellate Courts will not 
review the failure to object to instructions or objection to 
failure to give instructions or special verdicts, except in 
special circumstances. The burden of showing special 
circumstances exist is on the party claim error. U.R.C.P. 51; 
E.A. Strout W. Realty Aaencv v. W.C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1983); Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1987). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of an automobile accident involving 
Plaintiff Chanhmany, and Defendants Bone and Preston. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The case was tried by jury April 27-29, 1993. At the 
conclusion of the case, the jury returned a verdict finding Brian 
Bone 100 percent negligent. The jury found Plaintiff incurred 
$2,100 in medical expenses. The jury further awarded general 
damages in the amount of $3,000. R. 342-343. 
Plaintiff did not request instructions regarding threshold 
requirements under Utah no-fault law or request instructions or 
special verdicts regarding whether Plaintiff was permanently 
disabled as a result of the accident. Plaintiff's own proposed 
jury instructions merely listed disability as an element of 
general damages. R. 106, 111. 
The Defendant brought a motion to strike the $3,000 general 
damage award based on Plaintiff's failure to meet the no-fault 
threshold for medical expenses. The court granted Defendant's 
motion and struck the general damage award. R. 392-394; R. 391. 
Plaintiff filed an exception and motion for new trial which 
was denied. R. 425. This appeal followed. 
-4-
C. Statement of the Facts 
Appellees accept Plaintiff's facts regarding the 
circumstances and cause of the accident. 
At voir dire of the jury, Plaintiff's counsel was aware of 
the expressed reservations of two jurors regarding the propriety 
of treatment by chiropractors. Despite the reservations, 
Plaintiff's counsel passed the jury for cause without objection 
to Mr. Nordstrom or Mr. Staheli in chambers, TR. 45, or in open 
court TR. 46. Further, Plaintiff's counsel did not exercise any 
preemptory challenges to excuse the now allegedly prejudiced or 
biased jurors. TR 46-47. 
In her case in chief, Plaintiff alleged $3,299.09 in medical 
expenses were related to the accident. TR. 278-79, Exhibit 3. 
Plaintiff admitted, however, that she did not seek treatment 
for nearly a one-year period, from September 13, 1989 to November 
of 1990. See TR. 372; Exhibit P-3; TR. 135. Plaintiff's return 
for treatment also coincided with her second pregnancy, TR. 159, 
which her doctor admitted could have been the sole cause of her 
back pain. TR. 160-161. Plaintiff also admitted that after the 
birth of her child she did not do any of the exercises prescribed 
by her doctors. TR. 80. 
Plaintiff did not offer any evidence that she suffered a 
permanent disability. Instead, Plaintiff elicited evidence that 
she had received a permanent impairment rating from both 
Plaintiff's and Defendants' doctors ranging from 6.8 percent to 
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12 percent. There was evidence offered that an impairment did 
not mean that Plaintiff was disabled. TR. 221-222. There was 
also evidence that Plaintiff's impairment rating had no objective 
basis whatsoever. TR. 217. 
The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding 
permanent disability because no evidence of permanent disability 
was before the court. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to request any 
instruction on permanent disability or object to the court's 
failure to include instructions on permanent disability to the 
jury. Further, Plaintiff did not offer any special verdict 
requiring the jury to determine whether Plaintiff was permanently 
disabled as a result of the accident. Instead, the Plaintiff 
argued disability was part of Plaintiff's general damages. 
The jury found Bone 100 percent negligent and awarded 
Plaintiff $2,100 in medical expenses and $3,000 in general 
damages. The court, on motion, struck the general damages and 
denied Plaintiff's motion for additur or a new trial finding that 
Plaintiff had failed to satisfy the threshold required by Utah 
no-fault law. TR. 428-429. 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Where a plaintiff fails to prove at trial that no-fault 
thresholds have been met, she may not maintain an action for 
general damages and may not recover any verdict for general 
damages in her favor. 
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The plain language of the statute and the specific intent of 
no-fault law mandate a jury award for general damages be stricken 
where Plaintiff fails to establish no-fault thresholds have been 
met. Moreover, it is Plaintiff's burden to plead and prove all 
the elements of her case; including threshold elements. 
There was ample evidence upon which the jury could base its 
decision that Plaintiff incurred only $2,100 in medical expenses 
related to the accident. Plaintiff also failed to meet the no-
fault threshold by failing to plead and prove she sustained a 
permanent disability as a result of the accident. Plaintiff did 
not prosecute her claim based on permanent disability, but, 
instead, she claimed impairment as a measure of general damages. 
Plaintiff's failure to request instructions or a special 
verdict regarding permanent disability constitutes waiver of any 
claim of error by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was not denied her right to jury trial based on 
Plaintiff's own failure to offer instructions or object to their 
absence. Alternatively, the jury's award reflects that there was 
no finding of permanent disability and because there was evidence 
that the Plaintiff's impairment was entirely subjective, the 
threshold was still unmet, as a matter of law. 
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IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET THE NO-FAULT THRESHOLD BY 
FAILING TO PROVE $3.000 IN MEDICAL EXPENSES RELATED TO 
THE ACCIDENT. 
1. WHERE A PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD AND PROVE 
THRESHOLD MEDICAL EXPENSES, SHE CANNOT MAINTAIN AN 
ACTION FOR GENERAL DAMAGES UNDER UTAH LAW. 
In this case Plaintiff brought over $3,000 in medical bills 
to the courtroom alleging they were caused by the accident. See, 
Exhibit P-3. Upon examination and presentation of the 
Plaintiff's case, the jury found that only $2,100 in medical 
expenses were related to this accident. R. 343. As a result the 
trial court struck the general damages award of $3,000. R. 392-
394. 
The issue is whether a plaintiff may recover a verdict for 
general damages when the jury finds that the plaintiff failed to 
incur medical expenses in excess of $3,000 related to the 
accident, thus failing to meet the no-fault threshold set forth 
in U.C.A. § 31A-2-309. 
Under Utah no-fault law, a plaintiff must incur more than 
$3,000 in medical expenses related to the accident or she may not 
"maintain" an action for general damages. U.C.A. §31A-22-309(l). 
Plaintiff asserts that once this threshold is met, the action for 
general damages may be maintained regardless of the jury's 
evidential verdict on the threshold issue. 
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Plaintiff's assertion on appeal fails for numerous reasons. 
First, the plain language and purposes of the no-fault statute 
are contrary to Plaintiff's position. Second, the burden is on 
Plaintiff to plead and prove the threshold has been met at all 
times through trial. Third, the exclusive role of the jury to 
determine factual issues would be subverted if they were bound by 
the threshold determination, which is largely based on 
Plaintiff's pleadings rather than actual proof. 
a. Plain Statutory Construction and Legislative 
Purpose Require Plaintiff Prove Threshold 
Requirements Have Been Met, 
Under Utah law, unless the plaintiff pleads and proves a 
threshold condition, she is unable to "maintain" her action for 
general damages. U.C.A. § 31A-22-309; See, Allstate v. I vie, 606 
P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1980). It is important to note that the 
word "maintain" was chosen by the drafters over the other obvious 
possibility, "bring." It is very different to say a person must 
satisfy a condition in order to "bring" an action, as opposed to 
the fulfilling of the condition in order to "maintain" one. See 
Jepson v. State Dept. Corrections. 846 P.2d 485, 487 (Utah App. 
1993) (no-fault threshold may be met any time up to trial, making 
statute of limitations accrue at date of accident). By its plain 
language the Plaintiff must prove the alleged threshold medical 
expenses were caused by the accident or be unable to maintain the 
action for general damages, whenever that factual determination 
is made. 
-9-
b. The Statutory Purpose Would Be Defeated If 
Plaintiff Could Recover General Damages Without 
Proving Threshold Requirements. 
The purpose of no-fault law was to replace the common law 
with tort immunity for persons complying with its provisions 
until specific thresholds are met. Allstate, at 1200; Pinell v. 
McCrarv, 849 P.2d 848 (Colo. App. 1992) cert, denied (1993). To 
permit a party who fails to prove a threshold issue to recover 
general damages, would subject an otherwise immune person to 
liability for general damages. This result would defeat the 
express purposes of the no-fault scheme. See Allstate, at 1200. 
Consistent application of the no-fault immunity requires the 
Plaintiff prove threshold issues before general damages may be 
recovered, whether that be at the pretrial, trial or verdict 
stage. 
In Grand v. Durst. 482 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1984), it was 
held that the trial court properly ruled the plaintiff could not 
recover the $7,000 verdict in his favor because the plaintiff had 
failed to prove any no-fault threshold was satisfied although it 
had been alleged in the complaint. The Court in Grand, noted, 
"it is clear that because appellant failed to meet the threshold 
requirements, he cannot be awarded a verdict in his favor." Id. 
at 1009, n. 3. 
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff's failure to prove the 
threshold issue precludes recovery of a general damages award. 
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The trial court was correct in striking the general damage award 
in this case. 
c. It is Plaintiffs burden to plead and prove the 
threshold issue to the jury. 
In Pinell, the court stated the "statutory threshold is an 
essential condition of a plaintiff's right to recover damages in 
a negligence action, and the plaintiff therefore has the burden 
of pleading and proving facts which establish that one of the 
threshold criteria has been met." Pinell, at 850. The Court in 
Pinell. went on stating, "In order to satisfy this burden, a 
plaintiff must establish not only that he or she actually 
sustained an injury within the class of injuries specified by 
statute or incurred expenditures of $2,500, but also that the 
claimed injury or expenditures were caused by the accident at 
issue." Id. at 850. The court clarified that even if "the 
plaintiff incurred medical expenses which have been paid by his 
insurance carrier pursuant to (the no-fault statute) does not in 
and of itself answer the question of whether the medical expenses 
were caused by the accident." Id. at 851. 
In Cole v. Berkowitz, 373 N.Y.S. 2d 782, 783 (1975), a case 
nearly on point with the present case, the plaintiff alleged the 
threshold was met because he sustained $672 in medical expenses. 
The jury found, however, that the plaintiff had incurred only 
$472 in medical expenses related to the accident and awarded 
total damages of $1,500. The no-fault threshold was $500 at that 
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time in New York. The court of appeals ruled that the jury's 
determination was dispositive of the threshold issue and 
determined that the "jury's special verdict creates a complete 
bar to the recovery of non-economic loss (i.e., pain and 
suffering) which was the gravamen of plaintiff's damages on the 
trial." Id^ at 783; see also Grand, at 1009, n.3. 
Therefore, pursuant to the above authority, it was 
Plaintiff's burden to plead and prove that her medical expenses 
exceeded the threshold amount. Plaintiff's failure to convince 
the jury that the threshold damages were incurred is fatal to her 
ability to maintain a claim for general damages under Utah no-
fault law. 
d. The Determination Of Medical Expenses Related To 
The Accident Is Exclusively The Role Of The Jury. 
According to the Court in Pinell, "whether a plaintiff has 
met the statutory threshold is usually a question of fact." Id. 
at 850. The jury's determination of threshold issues must be 
permitted as a part of its fact finding role. To rule otherwise 
would be removing an essential element of the jury function to 
which Plaintiff fiercely claims a right in her brief on appeal. 
Consistency dictates that the jury be the conclusive arbitrar of 
the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff's alleged medical 
expenses were incurred as a result of the accident. 
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2. THERE WAS EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND 
LESS THAN THRESHOLD MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
On appeal. Plaintiff bears the heavy burden of showing the 
verdict was not supportable by the evidence. Cambelt, at 1242. 
At trial. Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the medical 
expenses were reasonable and necessary. The defendant does not 
need to prove unreasonableness. Joraensen v. Heinz. 847 P.2d 181 
(Colo. App. 1992) cert, denied (1993). In that light Plaintiff 
has erroneously complained that there was no testimony contesting 
the reasonableness of Plaintiff's medical bills# and therefore, 
they were sufficient as a matter of law. Moreover/ Plaintiff 
admits in her brief that there was a dispute over whether all her 
medical expenses were related to the accident. See Brief of 
Appellant/ p. 8. 
While the testifying doctors did not specifically attack the 
reasonableness of each of the Plaintiff's treatments/ the jury is 
not bound by the of the doctors' failure to address the issue. 
In making its determination/ the jury will be permitted to rule 
on issues of credibility and reasonableness. In Pinell, the 
court also held that the jury was free to believe or disregard 
the opinions of the medical experts as they were, "not 
necessarily conclusive on the jury/" especially where the 
experts' opinions were founded/ in part/ on the subjective 
complaints of the witness. Id. at 852. 
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By both evidence and argument, Defendants strenuously 
contested the relation of the medical expenses to the accident. 
The following examples from the record clearly show evidence was 
presented showing the alleged expenses were unrelated to the 
accident at issue. These facts were sufficient for a jury to 
base its decision that the medical expenses claimed were not all 
related to the accident. 
The evidence showed that Plaintiff had a one-year hiatus 
from any therapy or treatment by Dr. Whitley from November 1989 
to November of 1990. TR. 135. Not only did Plaintiff fail to 
seek medical care during that time, she repeatedly canceled 
appointments. TR. 804; Exhibit 3. 
Further, her return to the chiropractor for treatment 
coincided with her second pregnancy. She returned to the 
chiropractor in November of 1990 in her twenty-third week of 
pregnancy complaining of low back pain. TR. 159. Plaintiffs own 
doctor testified that the effects of pregnancy alone could cause 
the type of pain she experienced in her back. TR. 160-161. 
She also testified after her baby was born she did not 
continue with exercises prescribed by treating doctors. TR. 88. 
She was seen by her chiropractor an additional fifteen times 
after returning to her chiropractor in November of 1990. TR. 
804; Exhibit 3. 
The jury was free to assimilate this evidence along with the 
bills submitted by Plaintiff's doctors and determine that some or 
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all of the treatments incurred were not related to the accident, 
but associated with other factors such as her pregnancy. Further 
the jury was free to determine that Plaintiff had not mitigated 
her damages by failing to perform prescribed exercises as 
directed by her doctors, thereby making some or all of the 
medical bills unnecessary or unreasonable. 
It is obvious that there was ample evidence presented upon 
which a jury could rely to find that Plaintiff's medical bills 
were, at least in part, unrelated to the accident at issue in 
this case. It is strictly within the providence of the jury to 
make such determinations based on the weight of the evidence and 
credibility of the witnesses. Plaintiff cannot be heard to 
complain that the jury found that she did not incur over $3,000 
in medical expenses when there was evidence upon which they jury 
could have based its decision. The trial court in this case was 
entirely correct in determining that the threshold had not been 
met and that the suit could not be maintained for general damages 
as a result. 
B. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OR EVEN 
QUESTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS ON DISABILITY TO THE 
JURY, WAIVING ANY CLAIM OF ERROR OR THAT JURY 
TRIAL WAS DENIED, AND FAILING TO MEET THE 
THRESHOLD UNDER UTAH LAW. 
It is a matter of record that Plaintiff did not specifically 
address the issue or even prosecute her claim as one of permanent 
disability to satisfy the no-fault threshold. Rather, there was 
only testimony of Plaintiff's impairment. As stated above, it is 
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the Plaintiff's duty to plead and prove that a no-fault threshold 
has been met. Pinell, at 850. In this case Plaintiff assigns 
error to the Court's failure to acknowledge that plaintiff was 
permanently disabled because she received an impairment rating 
and failure to instruct the jury accordingly. 
As will be shown, the Plaintiff failed to present any 
evidence or offer any instruction regarding permanent disability 
or object to the court's exclusion of such instructions, thereby 
waiving any claim of error on appeal. See U.R.C.P. 49, 51. 
Further, even if the issue of disability should have been 
addressed by the jury, there was no evidence of permanent 
disability presented by the Plaintiff below. Finally, even if an 
impairment rating can be considered a finding of permanent 
disability, any error was harmless because there was evidence 
that the impairment was subjective, rather than objective in 
nature. 
1. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD OR PROVE PERMANENT 
DISABILITY, MAKING HER CLAIM OF DENIAL OF JURY TRIAL ON 
THE ISSUE IS MERITLESS. 
Throughout the trial, Plaintiff confused the term impairment 
with the term disability. See, e.g., TR. 111. Prior to trial 
Defendant brought a Motion in Limine addressing the fact that 
impairment ratings were not the equivalent of a disability rating 
for purposes of claiming damages in tort cases. R. 254; see 
e.g.. Northwest Carriers v. Industrial Comm.. 639 P.2d 138, 140 
n.3. (Utah 1981). 
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In order to determine whether a person is disabled, an 
impairment rating alone is insufficient. According to the AMA 
guidelines: 
"Medical Impairment" and "Disability" Are Not 
Interchangeable: Medical impairment is an alteration of the 
individual's health status assessed by medical means* 
Disability is an alteration of an individual's capacity to 
meet personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet 
statutory or regulatory requirements. 
Babitsky, Understanding The AMA Guides In Worker's Compensation, 
p.36 (1992) (citing AMA Guides (3d ed. 1988 at 8)); See accord 
Northwest Carriers v. Ind. Comm'n, 639 P.2d 138, 140-141 (Utah 
1981). Utah recognizes this distinction. See Northwest 
Carriers. supra. 
In this case, no evidence was ever introduced which 
attempted to correlate the medical findings of impairment with an 
assessment in their impact on Plaintiff's lifestyle, earning 
capacity or job functions (disability). As Dr. Moress testified 
simply finding that a person is medically impaired may not 
indicate any associated disability: 
Okay. Then you're talking about this ability, disability, 
which is like judicial or a — it's not a medical — 
disability is not a medical term. That's for lawyers and 
judges and administrative law judges to determine, any 
people who get people back to work, to determine whether or 
not you can function with it, with a disability. 
* * * 
A neurosurgeon who loses the right thumb may be 25 percent 
impaired but would be a hundred percent disabled in terms of 
his or her profession. 
* * * 
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When it comes to Mrs. Chanhmany and her problem, it would 
depend on the type of work she did. She would really 
actually determine that — specifically she would need to 
have a functional capacity evaluation which you — which I 
don't know. None has been done on her." 
TR. 221-222. 
Here there was no evidence presented that Plaintiff suffered 
from a permanent inability to perform any occupational functions, 
incurred loss of earning potential, or other permanent 
disability. Contrary to Plaintiff's inference of ADA 
accommodation, Plaintiff did not testify that she was reassigned 
to a different job because of her injury. See TR. 90-91. 
Moreover, there was no evidence offered from a vocational 
rehabilitation standpoint that Plaintiff was disabled and 
precluded from any field or type of employment previously 
available to her. Witnesses from Plaintiff's employment 
testified she only required assistance at work for a few weeks. 
TR. 260. The fact she was reassigned, absent additional 
evidence, does not permit the conclusion that she was unable to 
work or was disabled. 
There was also evidence presented to the jury that Plaintiff 
was not limited in any objective manner from performing all of 
the activities of daily living. Dr. Moress testified that he 
could find no objective basis for her rated impairment. TR. 217. 
The jury was justified in believing the testimony of Dr. Moress 
over that of Dr. Whitely. 
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The court in Cole, supra, found that the only other possible 
basis for claiming the threshold had been met in that case 
(permanent disability) had been properly removed from the jury by 
the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence of permanent 
disability. See, Cole, at 783. 
In this case, Plaintiff failed to show any evidence of 
permanent disability as opposed to evidence of impairment, 
thereby failing to plead and prove the threshold element of 
permanent disability as a matter of law. The court was entirely 
correct in not submitting the issue to the jury in light of 
Plaintiff's failure to bring any evidence of permanent 
disability. The jury's decision in light most consistent with 
the verdict, also indicates that there was no finding of 
permanent injury and that there was evidence that no permanent 
injury was sustained. 
2. FAILURE TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS OR SPECIAL VERDICTS 
REGARDING PERMANENT DISABILITY RESULTS IN WAIVER. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to offer 
specific objections to instructions given or the Court's or 
failure to give them will constitute waiver of error on appeal. 
U.R.C.P. 49, 51; Cambelt Int'l. Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1987); Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods, Inc.. 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
The Plaintiff knew that the issue of whether permanent 
disability could be established by merely alleging impairment was 
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contested prior to trial by motion and Plaintiff knew that it 
would be contested at trial. See Motion in Limine, R. 254-259. 
However, Plaintiff failed to request any instructions or object 
to the trial court's failure to include instructions or special 
verdicts regarding a finding of permanent disability by the jury. 
Instead, Plaintiff chose to posture her case exclusively on the 
medical expense threshold and use the impairment rating as an 
indicator of Plaintiff's general damages. Plaintiff's own 
proposed jury instructions merely use disability and impairment 
as a measure of general damages. R. 106, 111. Plaintiff's 
disingenuous claim that the court "concluded" Plaintiff was 
disabled misrepresents the context of the judge's statement, 
which was made outside of the presence of the jury on a 
tangential issue. TR. 268-271. 
Plaintiff's claim that she was denied a jury trial on the 
issue omits the obvious fact that she was the architect of her 
case and failed to bring the issue to the court for resolution. 
No error can be found with the Court for Plaintiff's own lack of 
prosecution of the issue. 
Plaintiff's failure to understand the difference between 
impairment and disability while prosecuting the case should not 
work to Defendants' detriment. To find otherwise gives Plaintiff 
two bites at the apple. Plaintiff wittingly chose not to seek of 
obtain expert opinion on permanent disability, instead she chose 
to rely on the impairment rating (and disability) as an element 
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of her general damages and relied solely on the medical expenses 
to meet the no-fault threshold. She cannot be allowed to alter 
her basis for recovery after trial when the claim was available 
to her initially and not pursued. 
3. CLAIMS OF DISABILITY FAIL BASED ON HARMLESS ERROR. 
Even if Plaintiff's case actually presented evidence of 
permanent disability sufficient to meet the threshold and the 
issue should have been submitted to the jury, there was 
admissible, credible evidence showing that Plaintiff had suffered 
no objectively ascertainable impairment. On appeal Plaintiff 
points to the recently passed amendment to U.C.A. § 31A-22-309, 
in an effort to show that an impairment rating is equivalent to a 
finding of permanent disability, permitting her to maintain an 
action. However, Plaintiff glosses over the fact that even the 
new statute requires that the impairment rating be based on 
"objective findings". Id. 
In this case there was specific testimonial evidence 
presented by Dr. Moress that the Plaintiff's impairment rating 
was based solely on her subjective complaints and not on any 
medically objective findings. TR. pp. 216-217; 220-221. 
Therefore, even assuming that the issue should have gone to the 
jury on the basis of an impairment rating alone, the threshold 
still had not been met because the jury could have believed the 
testimony of Dr. Moress that the impairment rating Plaintiff 
received was based only on subjective factors. 
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Further, the fact that the jury found only $3,000 in general 
damages, and specifically found that amount was to include the 
one week vacation she missed as a result of the accident, 
indicates that there was no belief that she was permanently 
disabled, especially in light of Plaintiff's attorney's request 
for over $50,000 in general damages. TR. 343. Therefore, any 
claim of error is harmless and is not grounds for reversal or new 
trial. U.R.C.P. 61. 
4. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF DENIAL OF JURY TRIAL AND 
JURY PREJUDICE ARE MERITLESS. 
a. Plaintiff's Claim of Right To Jury Trial On The 
Issue Of Disability Is Meritless. 
The above evidence shows clearly that Plaintiff did not 
attempt to prove disability at trial, precluding a claim of error 
on appeal. Plaintiff merely argued impairment as an element of 
general damages. Plaintiff failed to object or offer 
instructions defining disability or even propose a special 
verdict on the issue. Merely because Plaintiff failed to bring a 
potential issue before the jury through her own waiver and 
oversight does not merit reconsideration on appeal or a motion 
for new trial. Plaintiff's argument of failure to afford her a 
jury trial on the issue of permanent disability must be rejected. 
b. Plaintiff's Claims Of Jury Prejudice Are 
Spurious. 
Plaintiff claims that the verdict was the result of 
prejudice against the chiropractic profession by two jurors. The 
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argument disingenuously claims that two jurors disregarded the 
evidence and found some of Dr. Whitley's bills unnecessary. 
Plaintiff would pretend by this argument that she had no 
opportunity to prevent the alleged prejudice. 
Under U.R.C.P. 47, where a party knows or believes a juror 
is biased before the jury is sworn, failure to challenge the 
juror before the empanelment constitutes waiver. Burton v. ZCMI, 
249 P.2d 514 (Utah 1952). In this case, the record clearly 
demonstrates that Plaintiff's counsel, with full knowledge of the 
now alleged prejudicial disposition of the two jurors, passed the 
jurors for cause. TR. 44-46. Further, Plaintiff's counsel did 
not exercise preemptory challenges to excuse the two jurors now 
alleged to have been prejudiced. Id. The lack of merit to the 
argument is obvious. Plaintiff cannot be heard to complain of 
prejudice in light of her counsel's own failure to act to remove 
the allegedly biased jurors. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee has shown that Plaintiff has failed to sustain her 
burden of proving a no-fault threshold has been met at trial. 
Therefore, the court was correct in ruling that Plaintiff could 
not recover general damages as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff failed to prove threshold medical expenses and 
failed to offer any proof of permanent disability. Further, 
Plaintiff waived all claims of error on the court's failure to 
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instruct the jury regarding permanent disability by its own 
failure to offer instructions or special verdicts. Finally, 
Plaintiff has waived claims of juror bias on appeal because 
Plaintiff was fully aware of the alleged bias prior to smearing 
the jury and she failed to challenge the jurors. 
Plaintiff's appeal must be denied and the court's judgment 
on the verdict, and denial of Plaintiff's motion for new trial 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1994. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TERK?)MLTPEMJT 
BRAnEEYlR. HELSTEN 
Attorneys of Record for 
Defendant Bone 
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A-1 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-309 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by sentence in Subsection (2Ha), added present 
L 1985, ch. 242, <> 27; 1986, ch. 204, *> 159; Subsection (2Md> and redesignated former Sub-
1989, ch. 261, * 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, section (2Hd) as present Subsection (2Me) and 
ch. 74, ^ 7. made, minor stylistic changes in Subsection 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- (D(a) and in the second sentence in Subsection 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "mam- (2)(a) 
taming, and administering" in the next-to-last 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS efits for lost wages from prospective employ-
ment only if the claimant establishes that a job 
Allowable benefits.
 w a s available for which the claimant was qual-
—Loss of earnings. if!ed and that the claimant would have taken 
Allowable benefits. t h f >ob T h e >*•»>*«»,d ld nf l n t e n d to P™" 
vide compensation for loss of earning capac-
—Loss of earnings. lty" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and 
A claimant who was unemployed at the time specific monetary loss Versluis v. Guaranty 
of his or her accident can collect disability ben- Natl Cos., 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1992). 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to per-
sonal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained 
one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the in-
sured or a resident family member of the insured and not insured 
under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehi-
cle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition inci-
dent to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
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(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 
re reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensa-
tion or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty 
in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
ncluding those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given 
>y the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
nade on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are 
•vendue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reason-
tble proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If 
easonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported 
>y reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is 
•eceived by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is 
ater supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days 
ifter the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the ex-
penses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of VI2% per 
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the 
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal iryury protection have been paid by another in-
surer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31 A-22-309, enacted by Subsection <2)(a)(i), which read: "for any inju-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, 3 160; ries sustained by the injured while occupying 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, $ 8; another motor vehicle owned by the insured 
1992, ch. 230, $ 9. and not insured under the policy." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
ment, effective April 29,1991, made minor sty- 1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the 
listic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote beginning of Subsection (1). 
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Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Objections to lnstruc-
Rule 46, F R C P tions to jury, U.R.C.P 51. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general 
Form of verdict 
—Duty to examine and object. 
Instructions 
—Right to object 
Harmless error. 
Cited 
In general. 
To preserve a question for appeal, an objec-
tion must be clear and concise and made in a 
fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon. 
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Form of verdict. 
—Duty to examine and object 
Counsel has the obligation not only to object 
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively 
seek to examine it, by failing to request court 
permission to examine the verdict and make 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection 
Error ^ 501, 5 Am Jur. 2d Appeal and Error to evidence absent contemporary objection at 
§& 545, 553, 558 trial, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 619. 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error & 202 et Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 169 
seq et seq., 248. 
A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself con-
duct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or 
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addi-
tion to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall t^ke the same oath, and shall have the 
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called 
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those other-
wise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against 
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall 
not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made 
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual 
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several 
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A 
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
objection to it, party waived any objection to 
the verdict form Martmeau v. Anderson, 636 
P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981). 
Instructions. 
—Right to object. 
The parties have a right to make objections 
to the instructions to preserve challenges to 
their accuracy, if counsel was prevented from 
making objections to instructions, he should, 
under this rule, be deemed to have done so. 
Hanks v. Chnstensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 
564 (1960). 
Harmless error. 
If the instructions are correct, any error 
which prevents counsel from making objections 
thereto is harmless error. Hanks v. 
Chnstensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 
(1960). 
Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 
(Utah 1981); Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory chal-
lenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. 
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as pro-
vided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken 
on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, 
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to 
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond 
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor 
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license 
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to 
such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous 
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then 
a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the ac-
tion, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as 
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, 
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such 
challenge. 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow 
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sus-
tained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further chal-
lenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, 
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be adminis-
tered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and 
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
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(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the 
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his 
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the 
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the 
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be 
tried with a new jury. 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place 
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a 
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are 
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them 
on any subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either dur-
ing the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished 
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury 
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be 
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must 
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers 
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or 
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from 
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves 
or any of them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delib-
eration, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testi-
mony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, 
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being 
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in 
writing or taken down by the reporter. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented 
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. 
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in 
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with 
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury dis-
charged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the 
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment 
for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict When the jury or three-fourths of them, or 
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to 
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their 
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the 
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the 
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either 
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or 
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clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling 
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be 
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be dis-
charged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffi-
cient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury 
may be sent out again. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) and 
(b) of this rule are similar to Rule 47, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Jurors generally, 
§ 78-46-1 et seq. 
Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10. 
Witness, juror as, § 78-24-3; U.R.E. 606. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Additional instructions. 
—Absence of counsel. 
Prejudice. 
—Entry of judge into jury room. 
Challenges for cause. 
—Acquaintance with party. 
—Bias or prejudice. 
Malpractice. 
Religious affiliation. 
Waiver of right to challenge. 
Wrongful death. 
—Failure to remove juror when cause estab-
lished. 
Prejudicial error. 
Correction of verdict. 
—Award of damages. 
Excess of maximum. 
Travel expenses. 
—Waiver of objection. 
Insufficient on face. 
Declaration of verdict. 
—Impeachment. 
—Intent of rule. 
—Three-fourths concurrence. 
Dissent. 
Removal of municipal officer. 
Deliberations. 
—Impeachment of verdict. 
—Knowledge of everyday affairs. 
Examination. 
—Judge's discretion. 
—Preliminary questions. 
Juror's misconduct. 
No verdict. 
—Directed verdict. 
Papers taken by jurors. 
—Depositions. 
—Pleadings. 
Introduction into evidence. 
—X-rays. 
Peremptory challenges. 
—Number allowed. 
Separation. 
—Outside communication. 
View of property or place. 
—Eminent domain. 
Cited. 
Additional instructions. 
—Absence of counsel* 
Prejudice. 
Where, upon request of the jury, the trial 
court brought the jury back into the courtroom, 
explained apparently conflicting instructions, 
told the jury to reread all instructions, and of-
fered future assistance if needed, unless appel-
lant could show substantial or prejudicial 
error, it was not error to have proceeded with-
out appellant's counsel who had left the court 
building. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 
1979). 
—Entry of judge into jury room. 
Where bailiff had informed trial judge that 
jurors wanted advice on a certain point, it was 
improper for judge to go into jury room to ad-
vise them in absence of and without consent of 
counsel. Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 
342 P.2d 884 (1959). 
Challenges for cause. 
—Acquaintance with party. 
In action by truck owner whose vehicle was 
damaged when it struck defendant's cow on 
highway, plaintiffs challenge of jurors for 
cause on grounds they were acquainted with 
defendant and were engaged in raising live-
stock did not fall within grounds specified in 
this rule, and failure to remove challenged ju-
rors from panel was not an abuse of discretion. 
C.R. Owens Trucking Corp. v. Stewart, 29 
Utah 2d 353, 509 P.2d 821 (1973). 
—Bias or prejudice. 
Malpractice. 
In a medical malpractice action, prospective 
juror's statement made on voir dire examina-
tion that she would give more weight to the 
defendant doctor's testimony because of his 
status as a doctor established bias and preju-
dice, which was not obviated by her statement 
hat if the doctor's testimony was not in accord 
rith the evidence she would accept the other 
evidence, and she should have been removed 
or cause; forcing party to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove such prospective juror was 
prejudicial error. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 
533 (Utah 1981). 
Religious affiliation. 
Whenever a religious organization is a party 
to the litigation, voir dire regarding the jury 
panel's religious affiliations is proper. Hornsby 
v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 
929 (Utah C t App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1988). 
Waiver of right to challenge. 
Ordinarily, if a party knows or believes that 
a juror or jury is disqualified because of bias or 
prejudice, the challenge must be asserted be-
A 1 
Propriety of substituting JUIOI in biiuicdied ke> Numbers. — J my *-*66, 72, 112, 114 to 
state trial after end of first phase and before 121, 125, 126, 131(1) to 133, 136, 148, 149; 
second phase is given tojury, 89 A.L.R.4th 423. Trial «=* 28, 303, 307, 312, 313,316, 321, 321V2, 
Examination and challenge of federal case 324, 325, 339, 340 
jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexual-
ity, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864. 
Rule 48, Juries of less than eight — Majority verdict. 
The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less 
than eight or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall 
be taken as the verdu t or finding of the jury. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
Rule 48, F.R.C.P. civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10. 
Cross-Reference.%. Numt>et of jurors, 
§ 78-46-5 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS instruction as to the number of concurring ju-
i^ rr * r o i An, , rors required to reach a verdict. Madesen v. 
£ E r f o f t u S a ! ofilcer. Brown, 701 P.2d 10«6 (Utah 1985, 
Effect of Rule 47(q). Removal of municipal officer. 
Intent of U.R.C.P. 47(q) is to allow the par- Removal of municipal officer does not le-
ties the opportunity to ensure that the requi- quire unanimous verdict by a jury; a three-
site number of jurors concurred in the verdict; fourths majority is acceptable. Madesen v. 
it is not a vehicle to bring into issue the court's Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d 47 Am Jur 2d Jury k 124 diet by number or proportion of jurors less than 
et seq. that constitutionally permitted, 15 A.L.R.4th 
C.J.S. — 50 ( 'J S Jufi«» \ 123, 89 CJ b 213. 
Trial § 494. Key Numbers. — Jury *» 32(2); Inal «=» 
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipula- 32' 0 
tion or waiver in state civil case, to accept ver-
Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories. 
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special 
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that 
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of 
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several 
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evi-
dence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring 
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall 
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus 
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon 
each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the 
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of 
the issue so omitted unless befone the jury retires he demands its submission 
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a 
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special verdict 
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The 
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general 
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of 
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or 
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to 
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct 
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When 
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judg-
ment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A. 
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsis-
tent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A 
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the 
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict 
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other 
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment 
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consider-
ation of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial. 
Compiler's Notes. -
Rule 49, F.R.C.P 
- This rule is similar to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts. 
Appeals. 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of inconsistent answers. 
Entering judgment in accord 111-
swers. 
Interest. 
Objections to questions. 
Proximate cause issue. 
Role of jury. 
—Special verdicts. 
Special interrogatories. 
Cited. 
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts. 
When special interrogatories or verdicts are 
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to 
object to the filing of the verdict or to move 
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for 
clarification; if a party fails to take appropriate 
action before the discharge of the verdict, that 
party generally may not later move for a new 
trial on the ground that the verdict was defec-
tive. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr Co , 
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985). 
Appeals. 
Where plaintiff did not object below, it can-
not raise the failure to give special verdicts or 
interrogatories on appeal without showing spe-
cial circumstances warranting such a review. 
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1987). 
Discretion of court 
The matter of entering judgment in accor-
dance with the answers to special interrogator-
ies is within the discretion of the trial judge. 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nel-
son, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960). 
Use of a special verdict is left to the discre-
tion of the trial court. Reiser v. Lofiner, 641 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), overruled on other 
grounds, Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 
(Utah 1988). 
It is within the broad discretion of the trial 
court to determine if special interrogatories 
are to be used and, if so used, the content 
thereof. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). 
The use of special verdicts or interrogatories 
is a matter for the trial court's sound discre-
tion. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P 2d 
1239 (Utah 1987). 
Effect of inconsistent answers. 
A new trial does not have to be granted 
merely because the answers to special verdict 
questions are inconsistent. Milligan v. Capitol 
Furn. Co., 8 Utah 2d 383, 335 P.2d 619 (1959). 
Entering judgment in accordance with an-
swers. 
Where jury's general verdict in a condemna-
tion case was in conflict with its answers to 
special interrogatories as to the value of the 
property before and after taking, the matter of 
entering judgment in accordance with the an-
swers was within discretion of the trial judge 
and was properly exercised in the case. Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 
Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960). 
Interest. 
Any litigant may demand the interest issue 
in an action for payment of past due money be 
submitted to the jury on special interrogatory 
where that issue has not been reserved for res-
olution by the trial court; if he fails to so de-
mand he waives his right to trial of that issue 
by jury. Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1979). 
Where defendant waived jury's determina-
tion of issue of interest on award by not voicing 
his claim until after jury's dismissal, thereby 
presenting the issue to trial court for final de-
termination, trial court's determination that 
jury had considered interest issue in its delib-
eration and that award in fact incorporated an 
interest payment was not arbitrary or capri-
cious and would not be altered on appeal. Ute-
Cal Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980). 
Objections to questions. 
Where defendant did not object to questions 
submitted in special verdict, he cannot on ap-
peal raise the issue that the questions were 
confusing. Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 
P.2d 264 (1957). 
Proximate cause issue. 
Where the case is submitted under a general 
verdict, proximate cause is for the jury. 
Milligan v. Capitol Furn. Co., 8 Utah 2d 383f 
335 P.2d 619 (19591 
Role of jury. 
—Special verdicts. 
Special verdicts that plaintiff both suffered a 
specified amount of damages and was guilty of 
contributory negligence were not inconsistent 
and thereby void, since in special verdict jury 
finds facts and court applies law. Brigham v. 
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 
P.2d 393 (1970). 
Special interrogatories. 
Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in 

—Splitting of negligence and damages is-
sues. 
Judgment no v. in favor of patient in per-
sonal injury action against hospital on the 
question of negligence and ordering of new 
trial to determine amount of damages was im-
proper since, in personal injury action, ques-
tion of how accident happened, who was at 
fault, and pain and injury occasioned thereby 
are so intermingled that if trial is ordered, in 
fairness to both parties, it should be on all is-
sues. Hyland v. St. Mark's Hosp., 19 Utah 2d 
134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967). 
Cited in Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 476 
(Utah 1981); Jepsen v. Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Chap-
man, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Gagon v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R.3d 
1330. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 199; Trial «=» 
167 to 181. 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 106 to 151; 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 857 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 59 to 61; 
88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 249 to 265. 
A.L.R. — Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or 
direction of verdict on opening statement of 
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury,on 
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this 
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object-
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the fore-
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity 
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of 
the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, 
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that 
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule varies sub 
stantially from Rule 51, F.R.C.P., after .which 
it is patterned. * 
ross-References. — Exceptions unneces-
sary, U.R.C.P. 46. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Comments on evidence. 
—Allowed and disallowed. 
—Proper. 
Accurate statement of facts. 
Copy of instructions. 
—Delay. 
Meaning. 
—Entire context. 
Necessity of objections. 
—Failure to object. 
Appellate review. 
Burden of overcoming. 
Court's failure to instruct. 
Wniver. 
—Opportunity to object. 
Effect of denial. 
—Purpose of rule. 
—When made. 
After jury retires. 
Before jury retires. 
During trial. 
Oral instructions. 
—Necessity. 
—Preservation by court si 
Specific; instructions. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment «= 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions*and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not Rule 606. 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Abandonment of motion. Correction of record. 
Accident or surprise. Costs. 
Arbitration awards. Decision against law. 
Caption on motion for new trial. Discretion of trial court. 
A-6 
reaei irom judgment unaer nuie 01 i^ivn proce-
dure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956. 
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of 
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or 
other parts of the records and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R. 
Fed. 794. 
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing 
relief from final judgment where its prospec-
tive application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 
309. 
Independent actions to obtain relief from 
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 61, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Admission of evidence. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Burden of showing error. 
Exclusion of evidence. 
Instructions. 
Judgment presumed valid. 
Judicial notice. 
Liability for costs. 
Notice of appeal. 
Party creating or approving error. 
Refusal to direct verdict. 
Refusal to grant mistrial. 
Service of summons. 
Substantiality of error. 
Trial error corrected in judgment. 
Cited. 
Admission of evidence. 
No prejudice results from the fact that part 
of the testimony as to a particular matter is ' 
hearsay where the witness also has personal 
knowledge of that matter, and testifies accord-
ingly. Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 
239 P.2d 215 (1951). 
Where the case was tried by the court with-
out a jury, error in receiving testimony of a 
party who was disqualified to testify by dead 
man statute was insufficient to constitute any 
ground for reversal since there was ample evi-
dence without such testimony to support the 
finding of the trial court. Thatcher v. Merriam, 
121 Utah 191, 240 P.2d 266 (1952). 
Facts that some evidence of insurance agents 
inadvertently got into the record was not preju-
dicial under the circumstances of the case, es-
pecially since one of the defendants was a large 
corporation, and there was no apparent reason 
as rendering federal district court judgment 
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R. 
Fed. 831. 
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion 
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 165. 
Who has burden of proof in proceeding under 
Rule 60(b)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to have default judgment set aside on 
ground that it is void for lack of jurisdiction, 
102 A.L.R. Fed. 811. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment ** 294 et seq., 
306, 307. 
why a jury would find against an insurance 
company and not against such a defendant. 
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 
121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d 764 (1952). 
Where personal injury plaintiff had intro-
duced evidence as to her sales ability and her 
opportunity for success and loss of probable in-
come of $1000 per month, it was not prejudicial 
error for defendant to be allowed to show that 
plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy and had 
unpaid judgments against her. Bullock v. 
Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975). 
Affidavits regarding the jury's request for a 
dictionary to define "proximate" in order to un-
derstand "proximate cause" were admissible 
where a question existed as to whether or not 
use of the dictionary was "prejudicial." Hillier 
v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Where the court did not find that the defen-
dant maintained an attractive nuisance as had 
been alleged in an amendment to the com-
plaint, no prejudicial error was committed by 
the court in permitting the plaintiff to file the 
amendment and to offer evidence thereto, over 
the objections of the defendant. Draper v. J.B. 
& R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d 
360 (1952). 
Burden of showing error. 
This rule places upon an appellant the bur-
den of showing not only that an error occurred, 
but that it was substantial and prejudicial in 
that the appellant was deprived in some man-
ner of a full and fair consideration of the dis-
puted issues by the jury. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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APR 2 9 1993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KHAI CHANHMANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOYCE A. PRESTON and 
BRIAN D. BONE, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 910907726 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence• If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, answer "yes." If you find the evidence is so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented# answer "no.11 Also, any damages assessed must 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. At the time and place and under the circumstances of this 
case, was the defendant, Joyce A. Preston, negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No >C 
2. If you have answered number 1 in the affirmative, was the 
negligence of Joyce A. Preston a proximate cause of the damages 
claimed by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
-2-
3. At the time and place and under the circumstances of this 
case, was the defendant, Brian Bone, negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. If you have answered number 3 in the affirmative, was the 
negligence of Brian Bone a proximate cause of the damages claimed 
by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes A No 
5. If you have answered questions 1, 2, 3 or 4 in the 
affirmative, state what proportion of said negligence is 
attributable to: 
Joyce A, Preston O % 
Brian Bone lOO % 
TOTAL 100 % 
6. Please state the total damages, if any, which have been 
incurred as a direct consequence of said negligence which would 
reasonably compensate the plaintiff. 
a}:.(. Past Medical Expenses $_ 
Past Wage Loss $ )0I* GJ^ 
General Damages ,V -%|u i c \o&r ^/y $ 5 0 / V ) , G Q 
TOTAL DAMAGES $ S^t r I . A 0 
Dated this "->' • dav of April, 1993. 
FOREPERSON 
00343 
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Bone 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and 
through his natural mother and 
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and 
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D. 
BONE, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled case was tried before a jury 
commencing April 27, 1993 and continuing through April 29, 1993 on 
the complaint of the plaintiff, Khai Chanhmany, versus both Joyce 
A. Preston and Brian D. Bone. The claim of plaintiff Randy 
Chanhmany was bifurcated from the case of Khai Chanhmany just prior 
to the commencement of trial. The jury, having heard evidence 
produced by the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, the Court having received 
the Special Verdict on the jury and also having considered the 
issue as to whether or not Plaintiff had met the threshold 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(l) and having made 
ffRJEff SatT&SJST COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 9 1993 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
Civil No. 910907726PI 
Judge John A. Rokich 
003 
its Minute Entry on July 1, 1993, based upon the Special Verdict of 
the jury and the Minute Entry of the Court, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintiff Khai Chanhmany was not negligent. 
2. The defendant Joyce A. Preston was not negligent. 
3. The defendant Brian D. Bone was negligent, and his 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the damages claimed by 
the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany. 
4. The total damages which have been incurred by Khai 
Chanhmany as a direct consequence of the negligence of Brian D. 
Bone are as follows: 
a. Past medical expenses $2,100.00 
b. Past wage loss 101.00 
TOTAL $2,201.00 
5. Even though the jury in its Special Verdict found 
general damages in favor of the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany in the sum 
of $3,000.00, in accordance with the Minute Entry of the Court 
dated July 1, 1993, the Court specifically finds that she is not 
entitled to general damages in this matter because she failed to 
meet the threshold requirements of § 31A-22-309(l) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). Due to the fact that Plaintiff 
failed to prove that she had met the $3,000.00 threshold for 
medical expenses as required by Utah Code Annotated S 31A-22-
309(1)(e) (1953, as amended) and further that Plaintiff failed to 
prove that she had suffered a permanent disability in accordance 
-2-
00393 
with Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(1)(3). The Court further 
finds that the award made by the jury for general damages was 
indicative that the jurors did not find Plaintiff suffering from 
any permanent disability. Further, the Court specifically finds 
that the plaintiff failed to comply with any of the other potential 
"threshold" criteria set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309 
(1953, as amended). 
6. Plaintiff Khai Chanhmany is, therefore, entitled to 
a judgment against the defendant Brian Bone only in the sum of 
$2,201,00 plus interest in an amount of $402.30 and costs in the 
amount of $219.00, for a total judgment of $2,822.30. 
7. Defendant Joyce A. Preston is entitled to judgment 
against the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany on the plaintiff's complaint 
of no cause of action and is entitled to her taxable court costs 
from the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany. 
8. It was determined that all judgment entered herein 
will draw interest following the entry of judgment in accordance 
with Utah statute, Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-4 (1953, as amended). 
DATED this r%^ day of July, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
^X/>J^ A - K^IL^JC 
^IpNORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
] 3 i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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